When was the battle of bexar

Joining Teniente was his mother, Olga right , who also took part in the reenactment. On this day years ago, Texian forces were savoring a victory in the first major campaign of the Texas Revolution. Bruce Winders , historian and curator at the Alamo, said the battle from Dec. With limited supplies and winter approaching, Gen. This is especially true for the Alamo, which has traditionally been portrayed as an old abandoned mission in the middle of nowhere.

Moreover, why did the Texans feel compelled to defend it even to the point of death? The Spanish recognized the geographical significance of the headwaters of the San Antonio River, which is why they established five missions, a presidio, and a town nearby.

The main attraction was not just access to water, though. The region represented a convergence of vegetation, wildlife, and people. For the Spanish, it formed the center of government, defense, and trade. In addition, it became a necessary stop for travelers journeying back and forth between the Rio Grande Valley and the Texas-Louisiana border. Revolts like the Texas Revolution follow a simple, logical progression. To be taken seriously, rebels must capture important places both for the resources they offer as well as the symbolic value that winning such prizes represent.

Cos broke the pledge when he returned in March of to command a column in the attack on the Alamo. This ensued with the Battle of the Alamo , culminating in its defeat and massacre of its defenders on March 6, This site is dedicated to the men who fought in the Siege of Bexar and to their descendants — the Siege of Bexar Descendants. Near what is now the Wheatley Heights Sports Complex around I found a cannonball about the size of a tennis ball.

A rough estimate places the site where the cannonball was found to be roughly 4 miles from the Alamo. If there is any resource out there that could substantiate this, it would satisfy my still little boy curiosity. Skip Mascorro. I just purchased a deed signed by Sam S Smith in in Bexar. I believe he fought in the battle there. Does anyone have any information about him and his life. They survived the battle. These movements had the effect to hold the enemy confined within his walls and to keep him in a constant state of alarm.

No reinforcements were discovered and but one mail was taken; this was intercepted by Colonel John Seguin and brought to headquarters of the army. The most important intelligence obtained therefrom was the expedition of Colonel Mexia against Tampico, which had the good effect to divert the attention of all the disposable troops in that vicinity to that point, which circumstance prevented their being sent to Texas.

Until the arrival of this mail the cause of no reinforcements being sent to the support of the garrison could not be anticipated. The commander-in-chief now determined to keep the main army actively employed by making various maneuvers and demonstrations before the enemy, which were commenced by dividing the army into two divisions.

The second division, under the immediate command of Colonel Burleson, marched above the town and occupied a strong position on the same side of the river as that occupied by the first division.

Our mounted companies were now drawn in from the westward, and were kept actively employed passing around the fortifications and from one division to the other, and occasionally making a feint attack, but never could succeed in drawing the enemy out to the open field. The two divisions of the army occupied positions about within cannon-shot distance and immediately in rear of the enemy.

A simultaneous demonstration was made on one occasion by an advance of the two divisions towards the town to points within a few hundred yards of their works, when our troops came to a halt, and a flag of truce was sent forward to General Cos, borne by Colonels Wilson and Macomb, inviting him to an immediate surrender with the troops under his command.

The object of this movement was to draw the enemy out to the open field; but, to the great disappointment of our troops, it failed to have the desired effect.

The Mexican general declined receiving the communications, and sent a message to the flag-bearers, who had been detained by his picket-guard, to retire at once or they would be fired upon. The enemy immediately opened a brisk cannonading upon our divisions from the bastions of the Alamo, without any other effect than a waste of ammunition, which was promptly returned from our small six-pounders, the balls from which generally took effect upon the walls of the Alamo and forced clouds of dust into the air; this was about the amount of execution done.

Our divisions were then countermarched to their encampment in good order. In a few moments after the firing had ceased the priest of the town visited the first division, and offered an apology from General Cos to the commander-in- chief of our army for his refusal to respect our flag of truce on the occasion just referred to, assigning as the reason for not receiving the flag that he had been ordered to the command of San Antonio, and by his superiors was ordered to defend the place and fight to the last; under such circumstances he considered it entirely useless to hold a conference with the commander-in-chief, inasmuch as he was resolved to obey orders.

Our bold and energetic movements struck the enemy with such terror as to keep him so closely confined within the walls that the Alamo and town both presented to us more the appearance of large prisons with posted sentinels than military garrisons comprised of regular troops.

On the 4th day of November, the adjutant-general and Aide-de-Camp Grayson obtained leave of absence, and returned to their homes.

Francis W. Johnson was appointed adjutant-general to act during the absence of Colonel Hall, and Thomas J. Rusk was appointed aide-de-camp to act during the absence of Colonel Grayson.

Captain Travis obtained intelligence of a caballada of horses belonging to the enemy being in charge of some Mexican soldiers several miles west of San Antonio. He was therefore ordered to proceed with the company under his immediate command and to capture them, which enterprise was accomplished on the 11th, without the slightest difficulty or resistance by the guards.

On the return of Captain Travis, he reported the capture of three hundred head of horses, which were generally in a bad condition and unfit for service, and they were therefore sent to the colony to be recruited.

Three of the guards were also taken prisoners and brought to the army, with such of the horses as were thought fit for use. This capture took place some forty miles west of San Antonio.

It was regarded by the commander-in-chief as an advantageous occurrence, as it was likely to weaken the enemy's cavalry, which was, in fact, subsequently ascertained to have been the case. Captain Travis, together with the men under his command, were highly complimented by General Austin for the important service rendered on this occasion.

Intelligence having been received of the landing of a company of volunteers from New Orleans, and that they were now on the march to join the army, the commander-in-chief determined upon making preparations for a vigorous attack upon the enemy as soon as these reinforcements and the twelve-pounder cannon should reach the army.

The two divisions of the army were accordingly concentrated at a strong position, immediately above the town upon the west side of the river, and the cavalry companies were kept in motion circulating around the town as formerly.

This determination was communicated to officers of his staff and some of the field-officers, and every preparation was made with a view to hurry the campaign to a speedy end. A battery was established near the river bank directly opposite the Alamo, in the form of a triangle, surrounded by a ditch, sufficiently large to accommodate one hundred men, and a cannon was placed in the centre; this work was accomplished in the night, unobserved by the enemy.

Upon being discovered on the following morning the enemy appeared greatly offended, and sent out some small parties to reconnoiter this establishment, which was not exceeding three hundred yards distant from the walls of the Alamo and some few hundred yards from the lower line of our encampment, As the reconnoitering parties approached this battery they made many bold and menacing demonstrations, in the midst of which our cannon was discharged upon them, loaded with slugs and other missiles, which drove them back in consternation.

The enemy then commenced a cannonading, which was continued throughout the day, upon this battery and the main encampment, without doing the slightest damage. Some few Mexicans were shot by our riflemen from the battery.

The enemy had a fine band of music, which generally performed during these interchanges of salutes. The ostensible object of establishing this battery was to answer the purpose of a position for a reserve force during the contemplated engagement and necessary to protect the passage between our encampment and the town, and also to be in readiness to check the enemy in any attempts which he might make from the Alamo upon the rear of our troops during the engagement.

On the evening of the 21st instant, the company of "Louisiana Grays," under command of Captain Morris, joined the army and was reported for duty on the following morning; the twelve-pounder cannon also arrived. The scouting-parties were all ordered to join the army, and an order was issued for the army to be organized into three divisions, for the purpose of storming the town of San Antonio on the morning of the 23d instant at dawn of day.

The health of the commander-in-chief still was so delicate as to prevent him from making such personal observations as he desired in order to arrange his plans of operations to the best advantage; he was, therefore, very much dependent upon such of his officers in whom be felt he could place implicit confidence for information in relation to the true condition and feelings of our army, and also the movements of the enemy from time to time.

Every day since the erection of the battery opposite the Alamo the enemy kept up quite a constant cannonading upon the same and our encampment, which had the effect to keep up a considerable excitement on both sides, although no damage whatever was sustained on our side. On the evening of the 22d, John W. Smith, who was a resident citizen of San Antonio, sent by a Mexican to General Austin a complete and perfect plan of the town and fortifications as they had been prepared for defence.

This Mr. Smith was a surveyor by profession, and had been held in duress by the enemy since the commencement of the difficulties; during the time he availed himself of opportunities to make said map, which was forwarded to the place of destination in good time to be very useful on this occasion. James Grant, who was a very skilful man and scientific engineer, had lately joined our army, and rendered very important service in devising the plan of attack, etc.

During the day the prospects in camp appeared decidedly encouraging; every man appeared firm and anxious for the conflict. In the evening the volunteers were all paraded and inspected, and reviewed by the commander-in-chief, when he made a few remarks appropriate to the occasion. The appointments to the different commands all being arranged, and all necessary preparations made, a report was accordingly made by the adjutant and inspector-general to the commander-in-chief; orders were then issued requesting the officers commanding the different divisions of the army to have the men comprising their respective commands paraded and formed at three o'clock on the morning of the 23d instant at the old Mill Station, immediately above the town, in readiness to make an attempt upon the fortifications of the enemy.

The commander-in-chief having made all other necessary dispositions for the occasion in contemplation, laid himself down to get a few hours' refreshing sleep. All things appeared progressing in the most satisfactory manner until about one o'clock in the morning, when Lieutenant- Colonel Philip Sublett, who was the immediate commander of the second division of the army, waited upon the commander-in-chief, and made the following communication, to wit: On receipt of your general order announcing that an attack would be made by storm in the morning, I have ascertained the disposition of the officers and men of my division, and believe it to be my duty to report that a majority of them are opposed to the measure and are unwilling to attempt it; and I concur in opinion with them.

General Edward Burleson, the immediate commander of the first division, was immediately sent for by the commander-in-chief, to whom this unexpected report of Colonel Sublett was communicated; he was requested to make an investigation of this matter, and also ascertain the feeling prevailing upon the subject in his division, and to report thereon instantly.

This officer accordingly reported that the feeling generally in his division in relation to the contemplated attack corresponded with that reported by Colonel Sublett in relation to the second division, but stated that he was willing to make the attack and lead on as many of his division as would follow him.

The commander-in-chief was greatly astonished and mortified at this unaccountable change which had so suddenly taken place in the minds of the volunteers, and felt extremely embarrassed as to the proper direction to give matters at that particular juncture; he, however, determined to persevere in the attack, in the event that a sufficient force could be obtained for the purpose to justify it.

He ordered the adjutant-general to make the proper investigation forthwith. The result was that not more than one hundred men of the whole army excepting the company of New Orleans Grays, who were willing and anxious for it to a man could be found willing to make the attack; he also ascertained that this wonderful and sudden change had been produced in the minds of the men secretly by some designing persons from motives of ambition and jealousy, which at the moment could not be precisely understood.

Necessity therefore compelled the commander-in- chief to countermand the order of storming. Under these circumstances, thinking that the siege might be prolonged for a considerable length of time, the army being out of breadstuffs and suitable clothing for the inclement season, a requisition was despatched to the provisional government for a supply of such necessary articles.

The army having laid out in the open weather for nearly three months, and very many being without tents, and the winter season now having commenced with severe cold, northers, and rain, more comfortable quarters for the winter season were regarded as indispensable by some of the officers and men. Fort Goliad was considered the most desirable position for the army to retire upon in the event of raising the siege, as its position was such as would enable our troops to cut off the enemy's communication with the seaboard, and also to keep the frontier under observation, and it was an eligible point from which to march, in the event of any hostile movements being made by the enemy upon our frontier settlements.

Orders were therefore despatched to the officer commanding that fort to the effect that Fort Goliad must be maintained and fortified as strongly as possible, and also to retain the force already there, together with all he could collect, informing him at the same time that, in the event of raising the siege of San Antonio, a considerable portion of the army would retire to that post.

Colonel James Bowie was appointed and despatched from the army to superintend the strengthening of the fortifications. General Austin, on November 18, wrote to the president of the Consultation. He says:. The army has done all that could have been done under the circumstances, without materials and organization, which latter is purely voluntary.

It deserves great credit for its sufferings and perseverance. I have every confidence a short time will end this campaign. The commander-in-chief having received a communication from the Consultation informing him of a provisional organization of an executive authority and council, and also of his appointment of commissioner to the United States and requesting his personal services at San Felipe without delay, feeling disposed and ready at all times to serve Texas in any station where it was considered he could be useful, he promptly replied accepting said appointment, and also communicated his intention to withdraw from the army as soon as the interest of the army would permit.

General Austin, in writing to the president of the Consultation, says: "Some prudence will be necessary to keep this army together, should I leave at once. I therefore cannot at this time say when I can be in San Felipe, but I will give you the earliest possible information on the subject.

Fearing that his withdrawal might produce some unpleasant dissatisfaction in the army, and being desirous to leave it in a good condition and thoroughly organized for future operations, he ordered a general parade of the army to take place on the 24th instant, on which occasion he delivered an address in which he announced his determination to accept the appointment of commissioner to the United States and withdraw from the army.

He clearly explained the importance of continuing the siege of San Antonio, and urged upon them therefore the necessity of their remaining and organizing anew instantly. After concluding his address, the adjutant-general was ordered to call upon the troops to volunteer to remain before San Antonio and to organize at once for that purpose, when four hundred and five promptly turned out and pledged themselves to remain.

The election being ordered to take place immediately for commander-in-chief, General Edward Burleson was elected without opposition, none having been allowed to vote but those who were pledged to remain. On the morning of the following day the commander-in-chief took leave of the army, enjoying the highest confidence and respect of the volunteers generally.

Very soon after General Austin had left the army, it was ascertained that during the whole time he was forming his plans of operations against San Antonio, his judge-advocate, W. Wharton, who was in the confidence of the commander-in-chief and was fully informed at all times of everything done and in contemplation at head-quarters, was constantly and industriously employed in making known the plans and instructions of the commander-in-chief to the officers and men of the army who were entirely ignorant of the facts upon which the actions of the general were predicated , to whom he would condemn them as unwise, etc.

Wharton, possessing talent and shrewdness of character, in this manner succeeded in exerting an influence upon the minds of many in the army. Wharton were intimate friends, and there can be no doubt that a perfect understanding prevailed between these two men to prevent, if possible, the objects of General Austin being accomplished, so that the laurels might be reserved for General Houston, who was electioneering at San Felipe for an appointment to the command of the Texas army.

This impression will not appear unjust when the fact is considered that during this same period General Houston, either anticipating or being actually informed as to the intentions of General Austin, wrote divers letters to his confidential friends in the army discouraging any attempt being made against San Antonio by that army, stating that an army of less than two thousand troops, well disciplined, could not dislodge the enemy, and as our army was weak and being destitute of the proper equipments and armament for such an occasion, he represented that an attack would be certain to result disastrously to our army.

Hence he advised that the army should withdraw from San Antonio and fall back upon Gonzales and await reinforcements; or, in other words, his meaning doubtless was to remain there until he assumed the command. A letter embracing this substance was read to the army by Colonel Sublett at the time preparations were being made for the attack upon San Antonio.

The reputation of General Houston as a military commander, and his efforts united with those of Mr. Wharton, as above stated, had the effect to completely paralyze and defeat the accomplishment of the plans of General Austin of storming San Antonio. Had it not been for the unrighteous conduct of these two individuals, General Austin would have captured San Antonio with but trifling loss of life. Before their influence was brought to bear upon the minds of the volunteers every man appeared anxious for the conflict, and all had confidence in the ability of General Austin to direct the engagement to a successful result.

General Burleson immediately assumed command of the army and proceeded to organize it into two divisions, determining to carry on active operations against the enemy. This being accomplished, an order was issued to storm San Antonio on the morning of the 4th of December, which progressed, and resulted in a perfect failure, doubtless from similar causes to those which paralyzed the efforts of General Austin on a previous occasion.

General Burleson, however, being firmly convinced that it was practicable to reduce the town, and as there were many in the army who wished to try the experiment, conceived a plan of storming the town with a party of volunteers from the army.

He accordingly authorized his adjutant and inspector-general, F. Johnson, and Colonel Benjamin R. Milam to raise a force of volunteers from the army to attack the enemy on the following morning, when two hundred and sixteen men volunteered for this service promptly. These volunteers were equally divided into two divisions.

The first was commanded by Colonel Milam and the second by Colonel Johnson, the commander-in-chief remaining with and disposing of the main army as a reserve. The assault upon the town was made at daylight on the morning of the 5th instant.

Each division gained possession of a strong position within the walls of the town without the loss of a single man. The main army occupied a position some six hundred yards above the town on the west side of the river. On the advance of the attacking divisions, General Burleson formed the reserve at the old Mill Station, immediately above the town, and held himself in readiness to co-operate as circumstances might require.

With a view to give all possible aid and succor to the divisions engaged, the commander-in- chief organized efficient mounted companies, which were employed watching the movements of the enemy, and in procuring provisions from the surrounding country for the use of the army. In this manner our troops were furnished with an abundant supply of provisions during the engagement.

Reinforcements amounting to about one hundred men were sent by the commander-in-chief to the support of the divisions engaged in town. The only attempt made by the enemy outside of his walls during the engagement was by a party of cavalry and infantry from the Alamo, which advanced upon our encampment in two divisions, the cavalry on the west and the infantry on the east side of the river; their approach being timely discovered, General Burleson was prepared to give them a warm reception by opening a brisk fire of grape and canister upon their advance as soon as they approached within good cannon-shot distance.

The enemy being surprised to find an encampment strong and protected by a park of artillery, declined making the intended attack, and suddenly drew off and retired within his walls.